

# YOUR CITY HAS BEEN WATCHING YOU.

*Here's What the Documents Show.*

An investigation by Brandon Cowan | Liberty Ledger Media | DeFlock Texarkana  
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## EDITOR'S NOTE:

*Liberty Ledger Media provided advance notice of this publication to the City of Texarkana, Texas (City Manager David Orr), Chief of Police Kevin Schutte, Captain Michael Henry, every current member of the Texarkana City Council, and Flock Safety, Inc., and invited written responses. Response deadline: July 9, 2026. City Manager David Orr and Council Member Jay Davis (Mayor Pro Tem, Ward 6) responded in writing, both dated July 9, 2026; Chief Schutte, Captain Henry, the remainder of the City Council, and Flock Safety, Inc. did not. Both responses are published in full in the companion City Response document. This publication reflects corrections made prior to release after the City's written response identified an overstated characterization of a contract clause; the corrected findings below remain fully sourced to produced public records. Where either response raises claims not found in the documents produced to this investigation under the Texas Public Information Act, that is noted directly beneath the relevant finding.*

Since June 1, 2023, eleven cameras have been tracking every vehicle moving through key parts of Texarkana, Texas. The system photographs your license plate, builds a physical profile of your vehicle, records your GPS location, timestamps the moment, and checks your plate against federal and state criminal databases — in real time. Documents produced by the city show that data is shared with a network of more than 800 organizations across 21 or more states.

The city council never voted to authorize the contract that built this system. The competitive bidding process was bypassed using an exemption filed after the contract was already signed. And under the contract's terms, a private Atlanta company retains a perpetual right to an anonymized version of that data — a right that survives even if the city cancels the contract tomorrow.

These are not allegations. They are findings from the city's own documents, obtained through Texas Public Information Act requests filed June 10, 2026, with supplemental productions received June 22 and June 25, 2026. Here is what the records show.

## 1. YOUR COUNCIL NEVER VOTED ON THIS CONTRACT

In July 2022, the Texarkana City Council voted to apply for a state grant to fund license plate readers. That is all they voted on — a grant application. They did not vote on any vendor. They did not vote on Flock Safety. They did not authorize any contract.

Four months later, in November 2022, Chief of Police Kevin Schutte signed a contract with Flock Safety for eight cameras — \$25,250 in year one, \$21,500 annually after that. He signed it as an administrative action, without bringing it to council, without a public vote, and without public notice.

The cameras went live June 1, 2023. They operated for six months before the council voted on anything related to Flock Safety. When the council finally did vote — December 11, 2023 — it was on a five-year renewal. The first contract was never voted on at all.

**THE DOCUMENT SAYS — Resolution 2022-072, July 11, 2022:**

*The resolution authorized the MVCPA grant application only. No resolution authorizing the original Flock Safety contract exists in the produced records. The contract was signed by Chief Schutte on November 2, 2022 via DocuSign — without a preceding council vote.*

**THE CITY'S RESPONSE:**

*City Manager David Orr states Chief Schutte had authority to sign without a separate council vote because Resolution 2022-072 named him the grant's "Authorized Official," and because the purchase fell under the dollar threshold that then allowed City department heads to sign contracts without council approval. The City does not dispute that no resolution specifically authorized a vendor, a contract, or its terms — its position is that no such specific authorization was legally required.*

**COUNCIL MEMBER JAY DAVIS'S RESPONSE (Mayor Pro Tem, Ward 6), dated July 9, 2026:**

*Davis makes the same argument as the City Manager and calls the "lack of council authorization" characterization "procedurally inaccurate." Like Orr, he does not dispute that no resolution named Flock Safety or the contract's terms — his position is that none was legally required.*

## **1B. THE DATA-SHARING OBLIGATION PREDATES THE VENDOR — IT WAS A CONDITION OF THE STATE GRANT**

The city's July 11, 2022 grant application packet for the Texas Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority (MVCPA) Grant — which funded the system's first year, before Flock Safety was ever selected as vendor — contains a standing condition attached to the state funding itself, not to any private contract: "The grantee is required to ensure that any opportunity to share intelligence provided by the purchase or lease of Automatic License Plate Reader (ALPR) assets under this grant is afforded if opportunity is provided by vendor/product to share read data with other law enforcement agencies."

In practical terms, the state's own grant program made network data-sharing a condition of accepting the money, months before any vendor was chosen and more than a year before council ever voted on a contract of any kind. From a public choice perspective, this is a textbook example of how surveillance infrastructure expands through the ordinary machinery of government grant conditions rather than through any single deliberate decision any identifiable official can be held to account for: no one at any single meeting voted to authorize 800-plus outside organizations' access to Texarkana's camera data. The authorization accreted through a state boilerplate grant clause, an administrative contract signature, and a consent-agenda renewal vote — each individually defensible, none of them individually subject to the kind of public deliberation the aggregate outcome would warrant. The state, not merely the vendor, built the on-ramp for this system's opacity.

## **2. THE PURCHASING EXEMPTION WAS FILED AFTER THE CONTRACT WAS ALREADY SIGNED**

Texarkana's own purchasing rules require quotes from at least three vendors for purchases between \$3,000 and \$49,999. To skip that process, you file a purchasing exemption form before you make the purchase, with an approved legal justification.

The Purchasing Exemption Form for the Flock Safety contract is dated November 15, 2022. The contract was signed November 2, 2022. The exemption was filed thirteen days after the contract was already signed.

The form itself documents that Captain Michael Henry contacted all three vendors known to supply this equipment — Flock, ELSAG (a Leonardo company), and Vigilant (Motorola) — and received competing quotes from two of them: Flock at \$25,250 for the first year and \$21,500 annually after that, and ELSAG at \$29,280 per year. Two calls and emails to Vigilant went unanswered. Henry checked the box for “available from only one source,” citing Flock’s existing partnership with Axon, the vendor already supplying the department’s in-car cameras, as the basis for treating Flock as the sole viable option despite ELSAG’s competing quote. The Finance Department approval signature — required to authorize the exemption — appears blank on the produced form.

**FINDING — Purchasing Exemption Form, dated November 15, 2022:**

*Filed 13 days after the contract was signed November 2, 2022. Sole-source justification cites Flock’s integration with the department’s existing Axon in-car camera system, despite a competing quote received from ELSAG. Purchasing Approval signature line appears blank.*

### **3. FLOCK KEEPS AN ANONYMIZED VERSION OF YOUR DATA — FOREVER — AND FLOCK ALONE DECIDES WHAT “ANONYMIZED” MEANS**

The contract says Texarkana, not Flock, owns the raw data your license plate generates. Section 4.2 of the Government Agency Agreement states plainly that “all right, title and interest in the Agency Data belong to and are retained solely by Agency,” and that “Flock does not own and shall not sell Agency Data.”

But further into the same contract, Flock has the right to take that data, strip out whatever it decides counts as personally identifying information under its own internal standards, and turn it into what the contract calls “Aggregated Data.” Once it does, Flock keeps a permanent, worldwide right to use and distribute that aggregated version forever — including after the city cancels the contract — including to train its own AI systems.

No outside party verifies that the anonymization actually works. No independent audit of the process appears in any document the city has produced. Flock alone determines what “commercially available standards” are sufficient to irreversibly de-identify a dataset built from license plates, vehicle attributes, GPS coordinates, and timestamps — the same category of data the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2026 ruling in *Chatrue v. United States* recognized as capable of revealing a detailed portrait of a person’s movements. And that right to keep using the aggregated data survives even if Texarkana walks away from Flock Safety entirely: Section 6.5 of the contract lists Section 4 in its entirety among the provisions that survive termination.

**THE CONTRACT SAYS — Section 4.5, Government Agency Agreement:**

*“Flock shall have the right to collect, analyze, and anonymize Agency Data and Agency Generated Data to create Aggregated Data to use and perform the Services and related systems and technologies, including the training of machine learning algorithms. Agency hereby grants Flock a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right (during and after the Term hereof) to use and distribute such Aggregated Data.”*

**COUNCIL MEMBER JAY DAVIS'S RESPONSE (Mayor Pro Tem, Ward 6), dated July 9, 2026:**

*Davis does not dispute the contract's terms. He offers a policy position instead — that “driving takes place on public roadways where a driver cannot expect absolute privacy from legitimate law enforcement verification” — a values argument, not a factual one. Asked separately about the 24-month auto-renewal and its roughly \$56,000 additional exposure, Davis confirms he was aware, saying it was “listed right at the top of Exhibit A... within our agenda packet,” consistent with what this investigation found.*

**4. THE COUNCIL WAS GIVEN A SIX-SENTENCE SUMMARY AND A PRICING SHEET — NOT THE CONTRACT**

When the council voted to approve the five-year, \$141,950 renewal on December 11, 2023, the staff briefing packet — obtained through TPIA production and confirmed against the city's own publicly posted agenda and minutes — consisted of a six-sentence executive summary, a resolution, an Order Form, and a Goals & Perspectives form. It did not include the underlying Government Agency Agreement — the document containing the actual legal terms governing data rights, hardware ownership, and termination.

The Order Form's only reference to those terms is a hyperlink on its signature page, directing the reader to Flock's Terms of Service webpage. The substantive contract language — the Aggregated Data license, the \$500-per-camera removal fee triggered by Agency-initiated termination for convenience, the 24-month auto-renewal provision, Flock's unilateral platform-upgrade authority — does not appear anywhere in the packet council actually voted on. The Order Form's feature table lists “State Network,” “Nationwide Network,” and “Direct Share” as line items, without naming a single participating agency. The packet's Public Information Plan shows every notice option unchecked except “None Required.”

This is the complete official record of what was presented to council before the vote. If additional information was provided to the mayor or council members outside this packet, it was not entered into the record.

**THE CITY'S RESPONSE:**

*City Manager David Orr disputes any characterization that council acted on a one-page summary alone, stating the packet totaled roughly 13 pages including “the five page Flock Safety agreement, including pricing, billing schedule, product descriptions, software features, and the terms incorporated by reference.” Read closely, that description matches the Order Form this investigation reviewed, not the Government Agency Agreement containing the data-rights and termination provisions discussed above — “incorporated by reference” is the City's own term for the hyperlink-based incorporation found here. The dispute centers less on which document was produced than on how it should be characterized.*

**COUNCIL MEMBER JAY DAVIS'S RESPONSE (Mayor Pro Tem, Ward 6), dated July 9, 2026:**

*Davis's response contains two different accounts of the same packet. Answering one question, he states the packet “contained the full contract text.” Answering another, he states the master terms and conditions “were not printed out within the council's physical agenda packets,” having been incorporated only by an external hyperlink — matching what this investigation found. The documents produced under the Texas Public Information Act contain only the Order Form described above; the Government Agency Agreement itself was not part of the packet produced.*

**CLAIMS NOT FOUND IN PRODUCED RECORDS:**

*Davis's response also states his vote was informed by months of ongoing tracking and reporting on the program since June 2023, and cites a specific figure of nearly 70,000 unique plate reads logged "within its first days of operation alone." None of these reporting channels or figures appear among the records produced to this investigation. This is presented here as Council Member Davis's personal account, not a documented fact.*

**5. RESOLUTION 2023-161 PASSED AS A CONSENT AGENDA ITEM**

The December 11, 2023 council meeting minutes confirm that Resolution 2023-161 was placed on the consent agenda — a batch vote on multiple items passed simultaneously with a single motion and a single unanimous vote, by design without discussion. The \$141,950 five-year surveillance contract, with its Aggregated Data license and 24-month auto-renewal, was voted through in the same motion as a baseball field scoreboard purchase and a bond fund ordinance. The vote was recorded at 6:14 p.m. Mover: Mary Hart, Ward 2. Secunder: Jean Matlock, Ward 1. There is no recorded discussion of the Flock Safety contract anywhere in the minutes.

The City states the item was placed on consent "because it was considered a contract renewal and expansion of an existing public safety program," and notes any council member could have pulled it for separate discussion. The City does not dispute that none did.

**6. THE POLICY SAYS AUDITS WILL HAPPEN. NONE HAVE BEEN DOCUMENTED.**

The department's governing policy for the Flock system — General Order 7.40.1, written eight days before the cameras went live — contains exactly one sentence about audits: "All logins and transactions will be logged into the ALPR system and will be audited to ensure proper use." No frequency. No auditor named. No reporting chain. No definition of proper use. No consequence for misuse. In over three years of operation, no audit records have been produced or documented.

**THE CITY'S RESPONSE:**

*The City states that the absence of produced audit records does not prove no audits occurred, citing two Attorney General rulings authorizing the City to withhold a related category of "audit log" material requested by others, and states the Police Department "is reviewing its documentation practices" and will make improvements "if warranted." The City's response does not identify any specific audit review that has occurred, by whom, or when.*

**7. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY AND ITS CONTRACT ARE IN TENSION**

General Order 7.40.1 states that ALPR data "will not be sold, transferred, or otherwise distributed to any non-law enforcement entities, except in the pursuit of an investigation." Flock Safety is a private technology company, not a law enforcement entity. The contract grants Flock the right to "collect, analyze, and anonymize" city data and to use and distribute the resulting Aggregated Data for its own commercial offerings and AI training. The department's own written policy does not clearly account for this arrangement, and this investigation found no document reconciling the two.

## **8 (Transparency Portal). THE TRANSPARENCY PORTAL: WHAT IT DISCLOSES, WHAT IT OMITTS, AND WHERE ITS OWN DATA DOESN'T ADD UP**

This investigation reviewed the Flock Safety Transparency Portal at [transparency.flocksafety.com/texarkana-tx-pd](https://transparency.flocksafety.com/texarkana-tx-pd) — a page built, hosted, and maintained by Flock Safety, not by the City of Texarkana or TTPD — and confirmed its content against the underlying contract. The portal's statement that data “is owned by [the agency] and is never sold to 3rd parties” is consistent with Section 4.2 of the Government Agency Agreement, which confirms the city retains title to Agency Data and that Flock does not own or sell it. On this specific point, the portal and the contract agree.

What the portal does not disclose is Section 4.5's grant to Flock of a perpetual, worldwide right to use and distribute an anonymized “Aggregated Data” product derived from that same information — including for training machine learning algorithms — a right that survives contract termination and whose anonymization standard is set unilaterally by Flock. Nor does the portal contain the individual officer query logs, search timestamps, or audit findings this investigation sought; it is a general public information page, not an operational audit trail. The city's offer of the portal as a substitute for the organizational audit logs remains inadequate on that basis alone.

The portal is also not internally consistent on its own terms. As of its stated update date of July 8, 2026, the portal reports 247 searches conducted in the prior 30 days. But the portal's own downloadable “Public Search Audit” file — the mechanism by which the public is meant to independently verify that figure — contains 298 search records covering May 26 through June 24, 2026, a period ending two weeks before the portal's own stated update date. The summary statistic and the underlying data offered as its support do not correspond to the same time period and do not reconcile.

Both issues originate in Flock's own product, not in any TTPD policy, recordkeeping, or conduct. They are documented here because the portal is likely to be cited — by Flock, by the city, or by readers — as evidence that meaningful oversight of this system exists. On its own terms, the tool does not reliably describe its own data, and its silence on the Aggregated Data license leaves an incomplete picture of what the contract actually grants Flock. This is a separate and distinct problem from the substantive gaps in TTPD's General Order 7.40.1 documented elsewhere in this report — the department's search-authorization and audit-provision deficiencies stand on their own regardless of what Flock's marketing portal does or doesn't get right.

## **12. SHARED NETWORKS LIST — 800+ ORGANIZATIONS, NEVER ITEMIZED FOR COUNCIL**

A document produced by the city on June 25, 2026 — the Shared Networks List — identifies over 800 organizations spanning 21 or more states with access to data collected by Texarkana's cameras. The list includes private corporations with no law enforcement function — Lowe's Corporation and FedEx Air Carrier PD — federal entities including the US Postal Inspection Service and the Tennessee Valley Authority Police, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, more than a dozen state law enforcement agencies, intelligence fusion centers, and dozens of drug task forces.

The official record of the December 11, 2023 council packet — the sole documented basis for the renewal vote — contains no itemized list of participating agencies, only abstract product-feature references to “State Network,” “Nationwide Network,” and “Direct Share.” No accounting of the scale or identity of outside-agency access appears anywhere in that record.

**THE CITY'S RESPONSE:**

*Asked which agencies have Direct Share access, the City pointed to the Flock-run Transparency Portal, which names a handful of example agencies including the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Texarkana, Arkansas Police Department. The City's response does not provide, or dispute the absence of, a full accounting of the 800-plus organizations identified in the Shared Networks List.*

One entry stands out for a different reason. The 47th District Attorney's Office — serving Armstrong, Potter, and Randall Counties in the Texas Panhandle, more than 350 miles from Texarkana — appears on the list with its entire network entry reading simply “DO NOT USE,” rather than an actual network name. No other agency-level entry on the list carries a bare “DO NOT USE” designation in place of a network name. The city has not explained what that designation means, why it was applied, or when.

## **22. USER LIST — 87 ACCOUNTS, AUDIT LOGS WITHHELD TWICE, THIRD REFERRAL PENDING**

A second document produced June 25, 2026 — the User List — identifies 87 named individuals who have held Flock Safety accounts with TTPD since deployment, including Chief Kevin Schutte and Captain Michael Henry. One name, Rayveun Blakely, appears twice, suggesting a possible duplicate account.

General Order 7.40.1 restricts system access to sworn personnel and the department's Crime Analyst only. Whether all 87 accounts meet that standard cannot be confirmed; employee identification and role information has been requested and remains pending.

The internal audit logs that would show what each of those 87 users actually searched have been withheld from public view. The Texas Attorney General's Office has ruled twice, in response to two other requestors, that this category of log may be withheld under Section 552.108(b)(1). A third referral covering this investigation's request — Tracking ID OR26034075 — was filed with the AG's Open Records Division on July 2, 2026 and remains pending.

## **23. NO INTERNAL TRAINING MATERIALS — VENDOR-CONTROLLED PORTAL**

The city has confirmed it possesses zero internal training materials, user manuals, or instructional documents for the Flock Safety system. All officer training is conducted through a password-protected online portal hosted and controlled by Flock Safety, not the city. Flock Safety was notified of this request and is expected to assert proprietary claims before the Attorney General under Sections 552.110 and 552.1101; that referral, bundled with the camera-locations item under Tracking ID OR26034086, was filed July 2, 2026 and remains pending.

## **WHERE THINGS STAND**

This investigation is ongoing. On June 25, 2026, the city produced the Shared Networks List and the User List. On July 2, 2026, the city filed two Attorney General referrals — Tracking ID OR26034075 covering the audit logs, and Tracking ID OR26034086 covering camera locations and training materials — and City Manager David Orr responded in writing to this publication's pre-publication notice. That response identified an overstated characterization of one contract clause in an earlier draft of this reporting; the correction is reflected throughout this publication. The Shared Networks List, User List, consent-agenda vote, post-hoc purchasing exemption, and absence of any council vote on the original contract are unaffected by that correction and remain sourced directly to the city's own produced records.

The City of Texarkana, the Texarkana Texas Police Department, and Flock Safety have been notified of this report and given the opportunity to respond. Response deadline: July 9, 2026. Any responses will be published in full. Non-responses will be noted.

## QUESTIONS EVERY TEXARKANA RESIDENT SHOULD BE ASKING

- Why was the purchasing exemption filed thirteen days after the contract was already signed?
- Why has the audit provision in the ALPR policy never been implemented in over three years of operation — and if audits have in fact taken place, why are they not documented and shared as part of the public record?
- Why do Lowe's Corporation and FedEx have access to citizen movement data from Texarkana's cameras?
- Are all 87 Flock account holders sworn personnel as required by General Order 7.40.1?
- What independent verification exists that Flock's anonymization of Aggregated Data actually de-identifies the individuals in it?
- Why do the Transparency Portal's own summary statistics not match its own downloadable audit data?

*This report was produced by Brandon Cowan, founder of Liberty Ledger Media and DeFlock Texarkana, a community advocacy group with nearly 2,000 members. Brandon is a Navy veteran and lifelong Texarkana resident. All findings are based exclusively on documents obtained under the Texas Public Information Act. No external funding was received. Join DeFlock Texarkana on Facebook.*

*Where power leaves a paper trail, we're following it.*